tems. The enormous popularity of these systems, along with their longrecognized inadequate protection against misuse, made computer users susceptible. Virtual viruses able to infect multiple operating systems are rare (as are biological viruses with broad host specificity), and even when infected, computers that run on different operating systems (e.g., Mac, Unix) or other-than-Outlook e-mail programs usually are dead-end hosts for PC viruses.
Pathogens do not reinvent the wheel. Virulence genes are constantly "stolen" and reused. Thus, new combinations of virulence genes can result in new pathogenic strategies, and such combinations frequently accumulate in pathogenicity islands. Reuse and combination of effective (and infective) strategies are also common in computer malware. A recent example demonstrates the value of just the right amount of virulence. A highly dangerous worm called Nimda (Admin in reverse) was released exactly 1 week after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack in the United States. Nimda combined the most powerful strategies of Code Red and SirCam and spread more rapidly than any previous worm. Clicking on the subject line of an infected e-mail (to delete it, for instance) itself activated the worm.
However, because of the immensity of the threat, the Internet community responded extremely rapidly. Within hours after its release, alerts to system administrators on how to block the worm had effectively slowed its spread. Early surveillance and barrier development averted disaster. As in contained epidemics of hemorrhagic fevers, the immense threat of high contagion and lethality prompts effective measures to rapidly recognize outbreaks and prevent pandemics.
The types of measures to be used against computer contagion can be learned from biology. Immune effectors of plants and animals protect against a broad range of pathogens; however, in nature this system evolved over millions of years. Engineering protective computer systems with similar efficacy within a few years is a great challenge. Current protection programs mainly resemble innate immunity, but programs that learn from exposure (thus resembling adaptive immunity) are under development. Vaccination with relatively harmless microbes primes the immune system. Biological hosts also naturally carry protective microflora that compete with pathogens. Could we produce "virtual vaccines" that are beneficial to the computers carrying them (e.g., by blocking preferred sites of entrance for viruses or repairing viral damage automatically) and let these "good" microbes circulate on the Internet just as malignant viruses do? Crude versions of such vaccines have already been developed. Recently, a worm by the name Fixing the Holes was discovered that utilized known security holes to spread to other hosts. Using "good" microbes would have its costs: occupation of Internet capacity and consequent slowdown of data transmission and presence of malicious worms disguised as beneficial ones to elude detection.
Knowledge of infectious diseases may help control computer contagion. Conversely, study of computer malware may help curb infectious disease emergence. Internet contagion illustrates how pathogens emerge and spread in our increasingly small world. The speed of virtual pathogen evolution makes it possible to follow the process of mutation and selection in real-time. With countless interlinked computers, the risk for virtual contagion is so great that urgent steps are needed to avoid catastrophe. How many pandemics will it take before we accept the risks and costs of computer immunity? Similarly, to protect against emerging pathogens, we must use all tools available, including virtual pandemics. A task force to collect data on the epidemiology of virtual infections as a model for infectious diseases might be an important first step. (5), the extensive prophylactic use of tetracycline may have triggered the rapid emergence and spread of tetracyclineresistant strains in Madagascar. The high rate of resistance in Antananarivo, where the major Malagasy hospitals are located, could be due to easier access to drugs in the capital than in the other provinces.
Of the 60 randomly selected tetracycline-susceptible strains, 56 had the original antibiotype; four became susceptible to vibriostatic agent O129 and to all the antibiotics tested, except trimethoprim. Four (3.5%) of the 115 strains tested (55 tetracycline-resistant and 60 tetracycline-susceptible strains) on a large panel of antibiotics were susceptible to trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole. As usually observed in other African cholera-endemic countries (6), only a small proportion of the strains were susceptible to trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole, one of the most frequently dispensed drugs.
Faced with this first emergence of cholera in Madagascar and its rapid spread, medical authorities reacted immediately by using doxycycline as chemoprophylaxis (contrary to World Health Organization recommendations [7] ), probably because of its easy availability.
Our study demonstrates that 2 years after the epidemic began, neither trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole nor tetracycline, the two first-line drugs used in Madagascar, can be recommended any longer for treating severe cases of cholera. This may represent a critical public health problem in the country, especially as most of the population cannot afford more effective but expensive antibiotics.
Therefore, Malagasy medical authorities should a) abandon any systematic chemoprophylaxis, b) advise only oral rehydration therapy for mildto-moderate cases, and c) reserve antibiotic therapy for severe illness (7) . These measures against the cholera epidemic should be accompanied by general reinforcement of microbiologic surveillance to monitor antibiotic resistance so that the island can respond effectively to any future bacterial epidemics. 
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